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a b s t r a c t
Constructing an identification scheme is one of the fundamental problems in cryptography,
and is very useful in practice. An identity-based identification (IBI) scheme allows a prover
to identify himself to a public verifier who knows only the claimed identity of the prover
and some public information. In this paper, we propose a new framework for both the
design and analysis of IBI schemes. Our approach works in an engineering way. We first
identify an IBI scheme as the composition of two building blocks, and then show that, with
different security properties of these building blocks, the corresponding IBI schemes can
achieve security against impersonation under different levels of attacks, namely, passive
attack (id-imp-pa), active attack (id-imp-aa) or concurrent attack (id-imp-ca). In particular,
we show that an id-imp-pa secure IBI scheme can be built if there exists a trapdoor weak-
one-more relation and an honest verifier zero-knowledge proof with special soundness,
while an id-imp-aa and id-imp-ca secure IBI scheme can be built if there exists a trapdoor
strong-one-more relation and aWitness Dualism proof with Special Soundness (WD-SS). This
new framework can capture IBI construction techniques that are not captured by other
known frameworks. It also helps to construct new and efficient schemes. We demonstrate
this by proposing two new IBI schemes, one achieving id-imp-pa, and the other one
achieving both id-imp-aa and id-imp-ca, and neither of them can be captured by existing
frameworks.
© 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
An identification scheme enables an entity (the prover) to identify itself to another entity (the verifier) as the owner
of some secret information. In a Standard Identification (SI) scheme, the prover holds a secret key and the verifier holds
the corresponding public key. In an Identity-Based Identification (IBI) scheme, there is an authority holding a master
public/secret key pair. Based on the the prover’s identity and themaster secret key, the authority generates a user secret key
for the prover. The prover then identifies himself to the verifier, who knows only the prover’s identity and the authority’s
master public key.
An adversary’s goal against an identification scheme is to impersonate the prover. However, the adversary may not
start from scratch. Instead, it may have eavesdropped communication between the prover and an honest verifier, or
played the role of the verifier while communicating with the prover, already for a couple of times. To capture these types
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of attack, corresponding security models are normally formalized into two stages. In stage one, the adversary obtains
communication transcripts between the prover and an honest verifier, or plays the role of a (possibly malicious) verifier
while communicating with the prover for a number of times. In stage two, given the information collected in stage one, the
adversary’s goal is to impersonate the prover, that is, to make an honest verifier accept it as the prover.
Varied by the different capabilities of the adversary in the first stage, threemajor notions of security for IBI schemes have
been defined: security against impersonation under passive attack (id-imp-pa), active attack (id-imp-aa), and concurrent
attack (id-imp-ca). In a passive attack, an adversary can obtain communication transcripts between the prover and an honest
verifier. In an active or concurrent attack, the adversary can directly communicate with the prover by playing the role of a
(possiblymalicious) verifier. The difference between id-imp-aa and id-imp-ca is that in the former attackmodel, the adversary
can only have one active session at a time, while in the latter one, the adversary can have concurrent sessions.
Since the introduction of identity-based cryptography by Shamir in 1984 [22], many IBI schemes have been proposed. A
recent survey can be found in [2]. Also in [2], Bellare, Namprempre and Neven proposed a framework that transforms any SI
scheme satisfying certain security conditions (referred to as a convertible SI scheme) to an IBI scheme with security against
impersonation under certain attack (which is determined by the actual security conditions satisfied by the underlying
convertible SI) in the random oracle model [4]. Independently, in [19], Kurosawa and Heng proposed another framework.
This framework transforms any digital signature scheme, which is existentially unforgeable, against adaptive chosen
message attacks [14], to an IBI scheme with id-imp-pa security.
1.1. Our results
We propose a new framework to construct provably secure IBI schemes. There are three contributions in this paper.
First, we show how to construct an IBI scheme from two building blocks: a hard relation and an interactive proof system.
For the hard relation, we propose two types, namely Trapdoor Weak-one-more Relation (TWR) and Trapdoor Strong-one-
more Relation (TSR). For the interactive proof system, we consider a conventional honest verifier zero-knowledge proof
with special soundness (HVZK-SS) and also propose a new notion, calledWitness Dualism proof with Special Soundness (WD-
SS) and show that Witness Dualism is a weaker form of Witness Indistinguishability [12]. We show that ‘‘TWR + HVZK-SS’’
yields an id-imp-pa secure IBI scheme, and ‘‘TSR + WD-SS’’ yields an IBI scheme which is both id-imp-aa and id-imp-ca
secure, in the random oracle model [4]. We also show that, without random oracle, ‘‘TWR + HVZK-SS’’ and ‘‘TSR + WD-SS’’
frameworks yield IBI schemes with security against impersonation under passive attacks and active/concurrent attacks,
respectively, in a newly proposed model calledWeak Selective-ID Model. Second, we show that each of these new building
blocks can be instantiated efficiently. We will see that a TWR can be built if there exists a trapdoor one-way permutation,
or a signature scheme with existential unforgeability against knownmessage attacks (rather than chosen message attacks),
or if the Computational Diffie–Hellman (CDH) problem is hard. On the instantiation of TSR, we show that a TSR can be built
if the factorization problem or the RSA problem is hard, or if there exists a strongly unforgeable signature scheme [1] (also
referred to as non-malleable signature [23]) against knownmessage attacks. By combining these instantiations according to
the results in our first contribution above, we can see that many existing IBI schemes can be proven secure. This greatly
helps explain how these existing IBI schemes are derived, and enable modular security analyzes.
Third, we show that this new framework also helps construct new and efficient IBI schemes. We propose two new IBI
schemes, one with id-imp-pa security and the other one with both id-imp-aa and id-imp-ca security. The first one follows
the ‘‘TWR + HVZK-SS’’ framework with a new TWR based on the K-sCAA1 problem [20,11]. The scheme is very efficient in
terms of both computational complexity and communication overhead. The second IBI scheme follows the ‘‘TSR + WD-SS’’
framework. The TSR is instantiated using a strongly unforgeable signature scheme due to Katz and Wang [18]. The WD-SS
proof system is newly constructed for the Katz–Wang signature based TSR. This proof system also illustrates that Witness
Dualism is a weaker form of Witness Indistinguishability.
Compared with existing frameworks [2,19], our approach has the following advantages. The framework of [2] starts
with a Convertible Standard Identification (cSI), while ours starts directly with an intractable problem or a more standard
primitive. This allows our approach to include some IBI schemes which are not covered by the one in [2]. For example, most
of the IBI schemes transformed from digital signature schemes cannot be captured by the framework of [2]. Our approach is
alsomore generic than that of [19]. In [19], the transformation is restricted to an id-imp-pa secure IBI scheme, and it requires
a signature schemewhich is existentially unforgeable against chosenmessage attacks. Under our corresponding framework,
namely ‘‘TWR + HVZK-SS’’, we require the signature scheme to be existentially unforgeable against knownmessage attacks
only , rather than chosen message attacks. In addition, our approach can also construct id-imp-aa and id-imp-ca secure IBI
schemes.
1.2. Paper organization
In Section 2, we define IBI schemes and review the definitions of the three security levels (id-imp-pa, id-imp-aa, id-imp-
ca). In Section 3, we propose the ‘‘TWR + HVZK-SS’’ framework for constructing id-imp-pa secure IBI schemes in the random
oracle model. In Section 4, by modifying the security requirements of the building blocks, we change the framework to ‘‘TSR
+ WD-SS’’ and show that it can be used to build id-imp-aa and id-imp-ca secure IBI schemes. In Section 5, we propose two
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new IBI schemes under our framework. In Section 6, we evaluate the security of our frameworks proposed in Section 3 and
Section 4, but in the standard model. We show that our frameworks achieve security against impersonation, under passive
attack and active/concurrent attacks, respectively, in a new model called Weak Selective-ID Model without random oracle.
The paper is concluded in Section 7.
2. Definitions and security models
Definition 1. An identity-based identification (IBI) scheme consists of four probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithms
(MKGen, UKGen, P,V).
1. MKGen: On input 1k, where k ∈ N is a security parameter, it generates a master public/secret key pair (mpk,msk).
2. UKGen: On inputmsk and some identity I ∈ {0, 1}∗, it outputs a user secret key usk[I].
3. (P,V) –User IdentificationProtocol: The proverwith identity I runs algorithmPwith initial state usk[I], and the verifier
runs Vwith initial state (mpk, I). The first and last messages of the protocol belong to the prover. The protocol endswhen
V outputs either ‘accept’ or ‘reject’.
Completeness: For all k ∈ N, I ∈ {0, 1}∗, (mpk,msk)← MKGen(1k), and usk[I] ← UKGen(msk, I),V (initializedwithmpk, I)
always outputs ‘accept’ at the end of the User Identification Protocol after interacting with P (initialized with usk[I]).
The security of an IBI scheme is defined as against impersonation of the prover by an adversary who does not know
the secret key of the prover. There are three levels of adversarial capabilities [2]: passive attack (id-imp-pa), active attack
(id-imp-aa) and concurrent attack (id-imp-ca).
Definition 2 (id-imp-pa). For an IBI scheme (MKGen,UKGen, P,V), consider the following game carried out by a simulator
against an adversaryA.
1. (mpk,msk) ← MKGen(1k) is executed and mpk is given to A. Two sets are maintained: HU and CU. Initially, both HU
and CU are empty.
2. A can make queries to the following oracles:
(a) INIT(I) – create a user with identity I: If I ∈ HU ∪ CU , ⊥ is returned indicating that I has already been created.
Otherwise, usk[I] ← UKGen(msk, I) is executed and I is added into HU. A symbol ‘1’ is returned indicating that the
creation is successful.
(b) CORR(I) – corrupt a user with identity I: If I /∈ HU ,⊥ is returned, otherwise, I is deleted from HU and added into CU,
and usk[I] is returned.
(c) CONV(I) – get a conversation between user I (the prover) and a verifier: If I /∈ HU , ⊥ is returned, otherwise, a
conversation between a prover with initial state usk[I] and a verifier with initial state (mpk, I) is returned.
3. A can adaptively query INIT, CORR and CONV, and then output an identity Ib ∈ HU , which corresponds to the user that
Awants to impersonate. After receiving Ib, the simulator removes Ib from HU and adds it into CU.
4. A begins a run of the user identification protocol with a verifier V (initialized with (mpk, Ib)) which is simulated by the
simulator.A can continue querying INIT, CORR and CONV. The simulator halts when V outputs ‘accept’ or ‘reject’.
The id-imp-pa advantage ofA on security parameter k is defined as the probability thatV outputs ‘accept’. The IBI scheme
(MKGen,UKGen, P,V) is said to be id-imp-pa secure if the id-imp-pa advantage is negligible for any probabilistic polynomial
time (PPT) adversaryA. Let k ∈ N be a security parameter. A function  is negligible if for every constant c ≥ 0, there exists
an integer kc such that (k) < k−c for all k ≥ kc .
Id-imp-aa and id-imp-ca security. The id-imp-aa security is defined using a similar game, but having the conversation
oracle, CONV, above be replaced by a proving oracle, PROV. When querying this oracle,A provides an identity I ∈ HU and
starts a conversation with PROV(I), which is the simulation of P(usk[I]) by the simulator. The difference between id-imp-aa
and id-imp-ca is that for the former one, A can only have one active session with PROV(I) at a time, but in the latter one,
A can have concurrent sessions. The corresponding advantages of A are defined accordingly in the same way as that for
id-imp-pa security. The IBI scheme (MKGen,UKGen, P,V) is said to be id-imp-aa (resp. id-imp-ca) if the id-imp-aa (resp.
id-imp-ca) advantage is negligible for any PPT adversaryA.
3. A framework for constructing IBI schemes secure against passive attack
In this section, we propose a framework for constructing IBI schemes secure against impersonation under passive attack
(id-imp-pa).
In this framework, an IBI scheme is considered as a composition of two building blocks: a hard relation and a proof
system. For id-imp-pa security, we introduce a new notion called Trapdoor Weak-one-more Relation (TWR). In the following,
we define TWR and show, in the randomoraclemodel [4], that combining TWR (as the hard relation) with anHonest Verifier
Zero Knowledge proof with Special Soundness (HVZK-SS), can build an id-imp-pa secure IBI scheme.
A binary relation R onW ×∆ is a set of ordered pairs (x, y) such that x ∈ W and y ∈ ∆, where x is called a witness of y.
We denote the set of witnesses of y byW (y).
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Definition 3 (TWR Family). A family of trapdoor weak-one-more relationsR is a triple of PPT algorithms (Gen, Ver, Inv):
1. R.Gen: On input 1k, where k ∈ N is a security parameter, it outputs (〈R〉, t)where 〈R〉 denotes the description of relation
R onW ×∆ and t a trapdoor information.
2. R.Ver: For any k ∈ N and (〈R〉, t)← R.Gen(1k),R.Ver(〈R〉, x, y) = 1 if and only if (x, y) ∈ R, otherwise, it outputs 0.
3. R.Inv: On input (〈R〉, y, t), it outputs a random witness x R← W (y).
4. Weak-one-more resistance: Consider the following game against an adversaryA which is given 〈R〉 but not t , and has
access to two oracles:
(a) A challenge oracle RAM that on any input returns a random point y ∈ ∆.
(b) An inversion oracle INV that on any input y,
i. if y is an output of RAM, a witness chosen uniformly at random fromW (y) is returned, and the same witness is
returned if the same value of y is queried again;
ii. if y is not an output of RAM,⊥ is returned indicating that the input is invalid.
A wins ifA finds witnesses for all the points output by RAM but makes strictly fewer queries to INV. We say that R is a
Trapdoor Weak-one-more Relation (TWR) if the probability of winning the game is negligible in k for any PPTA.
The TWR familyR can be instantiated in many different ways. In Section 3.2, we describe several of them which have been
used though not formalized before. In Section 5.1, we propose a new instantiation for TWR. This new instantiation is based
on the K-sCAA1 problem [20,11].
Next, we review the Honest Verifier Zero-Knowledge proof with Special Soundness (HVZK-SS) with respect to a binary
relation R onW ×∆.
An interactive proof system (P,V) is said to be canonical if it follows a three-move structure where prover P initiates
a communication with verifier V by sending a commitment Cmt, which is distributed uniformly over a set CmtSet; V
then replies with a challenge Ch, which is chosen uniformly from a set ChSet; and P finishes the communication by
sending a response Rsp to V. V outputs ‘accept’ or ‘reject’ according to the output of a deterministic function 1/0 ←
Dec(StV ,Cmt‖Ch‖Rsp) where StV is the initial state of V. The bit-string Cmt‖Ch‖Rsp is called a conversation between P
and V. If Dec outputs 1, then (Cmt,Ch,Rsp) is an acceptable transcript.
A canonical interactive proof system (P,V) has commitment length β(·) if |CmtSet| ≥ 2β(k), and challenge length λ(·) if
|ChSet| ≥ 2λ(k). (P,V) is non-trivial if the function 2−β(k) is negligible in k.
Definition 4. An HVZK-SS for a binary relation R onW ×∆ is a non-trivial canonical proof system (P,V), such that for any
y ∈ ∆,
1. Completeness. If P knows x such that (x, y) ∈ R, then Pr[V outputs accept] = 1.
2. Special Soundness. There exists a polynomial time algorithmwhich on input two acceptable transcripts (Cmt, Ch1, Rsp1)
and (Cmt,Ch2,Rsp2) for Ch1 6= Ch2, the algorithm outputs x such that (x, y) ∈ R.
3. Honest Verifier Zero Knowledge. There exists a polynomial time algorithm SIM such that on input (〈R〉, y), its output
distribution is computationally indistinguishable from the distribution of a real conversation between P (initialized with
a witness of y) and V (initialized with 〈R〉 and y).
3.1. Our generic construction of id-imp-pa secure IBI schemes
We now propose the framework for constructing IBI schemes based on TWR family (Definition 3) and HVZK-SS proof
system (Definition 4). The resulting IBI schemes can achieve id-imp-pa security.
Let H : {0, 1}∗ → ∆ be a hash function that is modeled as a random oracle [4] for security analysis. A generic IBI scheme
is constructed as follows.
1. MKGen: (〈R〉, t)← R.Gen(1k). Setmpk = 〈R〉 andmsk = t .
2. UKGen: on input I ∈ {0, 1}∗, run x← R.Inv(〈R〉,H(I), t) and set usk[I] = x.
3. (P,V): run Pwith the prover algorithm P of the HVZK-SS proof systemwith initial state usk[I],
and Vwith the verifier algorithm V of the HVZK-SS proof system with initial state (〈R〉,H(I)).
The following theorem states that an IBI scheme constructed as above is id-imp-pa secure (Definition 2).
Theorem 1. Let R be a Trapdoor Weak-one-more Relation (TWR) which has an HVZK-SS proof system. If the challenge length
λ(k) of the HVZK-SS proof system is super logarithmic in k, where k ∈ N is a security parameter, then an IBI scheme constructed
as above is id-imp-pa secure in the random oracle model.
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversaryA, who breaks the generic IBI scheme above with advantage , we construct a PPT
algorithmB to break the weak-one-more resistance of the underlying TWR with advantage ′ ≥ ( − 2−λ(k))2.
B simulates the id-imp-pa game by settingmpk = 〈R〉 andmaintains two sets HU and CU, which are initialized to empty.
B also maintains a table T, each entry of T contains an identity I and the value of H(I). T is also initialized to empty at the
beginning of the simulation.B answersA’s queries as follows:
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1. H-query: On input I ∈ {0, 1}∗, if I 6∈ T,B queries its challenge oracle RAM to get a randompoint y ∈ ∆, then sets H(I) = y
by putting (I, y) into table T, and returns y. If I ∈ T, the existing value of H(I) from T is returned.
2. INIT(I): If I ∈ HU∪CU,⊥ is returned. Otherwise,B checks whether I is in table T. If I ∈ T, I is added into HU and a symbol
‘1’ is returned. Otherwise,B queries RAM to get a random point y ∈ ∆, and sets H(I) = y by putting (I, y) in table T, I is
then added into HU and a symbol ‘1’ is returned.
3. CORR(I): If I /∈ HU, ⊥ is returned. Otherwise, B queries INV to obtain a witness w for H(I) and returns w. I is then
removed from HU and added into CU.
4. CONV(I): If I /∈ HU,⊥ is returned. Otherwise,B runs the simulation algorithmSIM (Definition 4) to generate a simulated
transcript and returns it toA.
IfA successfully impersonates a user Ib, that is created but not corrupted (i.e. H(Ib) is returned by RAM, but the witness of
H(Ib) is still unknown to B) with probability , by the Reset Lemma (Appendix A) and the special soundness property of
the underlying HVZK-SS proof system, B can extract a witness of H(Ib) with probability at least ( − 2−λ(k))2 through the
experiment described in the Reset Lemma (Lemma 3). Note that the ‘reset’ takes place after the adversary sends Cmt to the
simulator in Stage 4 of the id-imp-pa game (Definition 2). In this way, the value of Ib can be fixed and will remain unchanged
at the time of reset. 
In the following, we describe several instantiations of the TWR family and show that they capture many existing IBI
schemes. In Section 5.1, we propose a new TWR instantiation and use it to construct a new and efficient id-imp-pa secure
IBI scheme.
3.2. Instantiations of TWR family
3.2.1. Trapdoor one-way permutation based
Let f : ∆ → ∆ be a trapdoor one-way permutation. The following theorem describes a method to construct a TWR
family from any trapdoor one-way permutation family.
Theorem 2. The binary relation RTOP = {(x, y) : x, y ∈ ∆; f (x) = y} is a trapdoor weak-one-more relation.
Proof. It is obvious that RTOP is efficient to generate, verify, and find witness with trapdoor information. Nowwe show that
it also satisfies the weak-one-more resistance feature (Definition 3). Suppose there exists an adversaryAwhich breaks the
weak-one-more resistance, we build an adversaryB to break the one-wayness of f .
B is given a random instance y∗ ∈ ∆, andB’s goal is to find the inverse x∗ ∈ ∆ such that f (x∗) = y∗. SupposeAmakes
at most Q (k) queries to RAM, where k ∈ N is a security parameter. Initially,B randomly selects a number 1 ≤ i ≤ Q (k), and
simulates the weak-one-more resistance game as follows: to answer j-th query to RAM, if j 6= i,B randomly selects xj ∈ ∆
and returns yj = f (xj) toA; if j = i, y∗ is returned. WhenAmakes a query to INV on yj, if yj 6= y∗, xj is returned; otherwise,
B aborts. IfA finds a witness x˜ such that f (x˜) = y∗,B outputs x˜ and halts. IfA halts,B halts. It is easy to see that ifAwins
with probability ,B breaks the one-wayness of f with probability at least /Q (k). 
3.2.2. Computational Diffie–Hellman (CDH) problem based
For a security parameter k ∈ N, let q be a k-bit prime. Let G1 be an additive cyclic group of order q, and G2 be a
multiplicative cyclic group of the same order. Let P be a generator of G1. A bilinear map is defined as e : G1 × G1 → G2
with the following properties:
1. bilinear: For any U, V ∈ G1, and a, b ∈ Zq, e(aU, bV ) = e(U, V )ab;
2. non-degenerate: e(P, P) 6= 1;
3. computable: there exists an efficient algorithm to compute e(U, V ) for any U, V ∈ G1.
The Computational Diffie–Hellman (CDH) problem in G1 is to compute abP from 〈P, aP, bP〉 where a, b are randomly
selected from Zq.
Based on the CDH problem in the setting above, we construct a TWR family RCDH as follows: on input 1k, RCDH .Gen
generates (G1,G2, q, P, e, Sˆ = sP) where s ∈R Zq, and sets the TWR relation RCDH to {(x, y) : x, y ∈ G1; e(P, x) = e(Sˆ, y)}
and trapdoor information to s.
Theorem 3. If the CDH problem in the setting above is hard, RCDH is a trapdoor weak-one-more relation.
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversaryA, who breaks the weak one-more resistance of RCDH , we build another adversary
B to break the CDH problem above.
Similar to the proof of Theorem 2, on input (1k,G1,G2, q, P, e, aP, bP),B sets Sˆ = aP and randomly selects a number i,
such that 1 ≤ i ≤ Q (k), where Q (k) is the maximum number of queries to RAMmade byA.B then answersA’s queries as
follows.
WhenA asks the j-th challenge query (i.e. RAM), if j 6= i,B randomly selects a tj ∈ Zq, and returns Tj = tjP toA; if j = i,
bP is returned. WhenA asks the inversion query (i.e. INV) on Tj, if j 6= i, tj(aP) is returned; if j = i, B aborts. At the end of
the simulation, ifA outputs x such that e(P, x) = e(Sˆ, bP),B outputs x and halts. IfA halts,B halts.
In the simulation above, we can see that ifAwins the weak one-more resistance gamewith probability , thenB breaks
the CDH problem with probability at least /Q (k). 
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3.2.3. Digital signature based
Let SIG = (KG, S,V) be a signature scheme defined on some message spaceMS. In [19], Kuorsawa and Heng showed
how to construct an id-imp-pa secure IBI scheme from a signature scheme, which is existentially unforgeable against chosen
message attack (euf-cma) [14]. In the following, we show that under our framework, the signature scheme only needs to
be existentially unforgeable against known message attack (euf-kma) [14]. A signature scheme SIG is euf-kma, if for any
sufficiently large security parameter k ∈ N and any PPT adversary, it is of negligible probability for the adversary to forge a
signature for any of themessages inMS \Mknown after getting access to signatures for a set of messages denoted byMknown.
The messages inMknown are chosen uniformly fromMS, rather than by the adversary.
A digital signature based TWR familyRSIG can be constructed as follows. On input 1k,RSIG.Gen runsKG(1k) to generate
a public/private key pair (pk, sk), and sets the TWR relation RSIG to {(x, y) : y ∈ MS;V(pk, y, x) = 1} and the trapdoor
information to sk. In other words, y is a message and x is the corresponding signature.
Theorem 4. If SIG is euf-kma, RSIG proposed above is a trapdoor weak-one-more relation.
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A who breaks the weak-one-more resistance. We build another adversary F
which existentially forge SIG under known message attacks.
Suppose A makes at most Q (k) queries to RAM, for security parameter k ∈ N. First, in the game of euf-kma, F obtains
Q (k)−1message-signature pairs {(m1, σ1), . . . , (mQ (k)−1, σQ (k)−1)}wheremj (1 ≤ j ≤ Q (k)−1) are uniformly distributed
overMS and σj is a valid signature, that is,V(pk, σj,mj) = 1. In other words,Mknown = {m1, . . . ,mQ (k)−1}. F then chooses
uniformly at random a messagem∗ ∈R MS and inserts into the message sequence (m1, . . . ,mQ (k)−1) at a position which is
randomly chosen. Without loss of generality, we assume that any two messages inMknown ∪ {m∗} are different. The proof
then proceeds as in the proof of Theorem 2. For i-th challenge query (i.e. RAM) or inversion query (i.e. INV), F returns the
i-th message or signature, respectively. F aborts ifAmakes a query to INV with messagem∗. At the end of the simulation,
ifA outputs σ ∗ such that V(pk, σ ∗,m∗) = 1, F outputs σ ∗ and halts. IfA halts, F halts.
IfAwins the weak-one-more resistance gamewith probability ,F breaks the euf-kma security of SIGwith probability
at least /Q (k). 
In Appendix B.1, we review some existing id-imp-pa secure IBI schemes and show that they can be captured by the ‘‘TWR
+ HVZK-SS’’ framework. In Section 5.1, we propose a new instantiation for the TWR family. This new instantiation is based
on the K-sCAA1 problem [20,11]. Under the framework above, we then show that a new and efficient IBI scheme with id-
imp-pa security can be built. Before that, in the next section, wemodify the security requirements of the two building blocks,
namely a hard relation and an interactive proof system, in such a way that our framework can be used to build id-imp-aa as
well as id-imp-ca secure IBI schemes.
4. To achieve security against active and concurrent attacks
To construct an IBI scheme to be secure against active and concurrent attacks (namely, id-imp-aa and id-imp-ca), we
only need to modify the security requirements of the hard relation, namely the trapdoor weak-one-more relation, and the
interactive proof system, namely the HVZK-SS, in our framework described in Section 3. The new security requirements are
Trapdoor Strong-one-more Relation (TSR) andWitness Dualism proof with Special Soundness (WD-SS), respectively. Below are
the definitions of them.
Definition 5 (TSR Family). A family of trapdoor strong-one-more relationsR′ is a triple of PPT algorithms (Gen′, Ver ′, Inv′):
1. R′.Gen′: On input 1k, where k ∈ N is a security parameter, it outputs (〈R〉, t)where 〈R〉 denotes the description of relation
R onW ×∆ and t a trapdoor information.
2. R′.Ver ′: For any k ∈ N and (〈R〉, t)← R′.Gen′(1k),R′.Ver ′(〈R〉, x, y) = 1 if and only if (x, y) ∈ R.
3. R′.Inv′: On input (〈R〉, y, t), it outputs a random witness x R← W (y).
4. Strong-one-more resistance: Consider the following game against an adversaryAwhich is given 〈R〉 but not t , and has
access to two oracles:
(a) A challenge oracle RAM that on any input returns a random point y ∈ ∆.
(b) An inversion oracle INV that on any input y,
i. if y is an output of RAM, a witness chosen uniformly at random fromW (y) is returned, and the same witness is
returned if the same value of y is queried again;
ii. if y is not an output of RAM,⊥ is returned indicating that the input is invalid.
A wins if A finds a pair (x′, y′) ∈ R such that y′ is an output of RAM but (x′, y′) does not appear in the input/output
pairs of INV (i.e. A is able to generate a distinct pair in R other than the pairs obtained from INV 1). R is a Trapdoor
Strong-one-more Relation (TSR) if the probability of winning the game is negligible in k for any PPTA.
1 Note that there are two possibilities. Case 1: y′ has never been queried to INV; Case 2: INV has returned a witness x of y′ before, but x′ 6= x.
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The TSR familyR′ can also be instantiated inmany different ways. In Section 4.2, we describe several of them. In Section 5.2,
we propose a new instantiation and construct a new IBI scheme based on it.
Next, we define a new notion for interactive proof systems. The new notion is calledWitness Dualism proof with Special
Soundness (WD-SS). We will see shortly that Witness Dualism is a weaker form of Witness Indistinguishability [12].
Definition 6 (WD-SS). A Witness Dualism proof system with Special Soundness (WD-SS) for a binary relation R onW ×∆
is a non-trivial canonical interactive proof system (P,V) such that for any y ∈ ∆,
1. Completeness. If P knows x such that (x, y) ∈ R, then Pr[V outputs accept] = 1.
2. Special Soundness. There exists a polynomial time algorithmwhich on input two acceptable transcripts (Cmt,Ch1,Rsp1)
and (Cmt,Ch2,Rsp2) for Ch1 6= Ch2, the algorithm outputs x such that (x, y) ∈ R.
3. Witness Dualism. For any x ∈ W (y), there exists at least one dual witness x′ ∈ W (y) such that
(a) x′ 6= x, and
(b) for any verifier Vwith any auxiliary input aux for V, the ensembles, VP(y,x)(y, aux) and VP(y,x′)(y, aux), which represent
V’s views of the interactive proof, are indistinguishable.
Discussion. The notion of Witness Dualism is related to Witness Indistinguishability, introduced by Feige and Shamir [12].
For witness dualism, given a witness x of y, we only require it to be indistinguishable from a different witness x′, rather
than from all other witnesses in W (y), the latter is required for Witness Indistinguishability. Hence, for any proof system
which is witness indistinguishable, the system also has witness dualism, but may not be vice versa. In Section 5.2, we
propose a concrete WD-SS which is not Witness Indistinguishable and show that Witness Dualism is a weaker form
of witness indistinguishability. On the other side, witness dualism still preserves some important properties of witness
indistinguishability, such as the concurrent composition property described below.
Definition 7. A polynomial composition of protocols has Witness Dualism (WD), if for all sufficiently large k, for any set
of polynomial-time provers P = (P1, P2, . . . , Pn) which follow their protocols faithfully, and any two sets of respective
witnessesW1 = (w11, w12, . . . , w1n) andW2 = (w21, w22, . . . , w2n) of the set Y = (y1, y2, . . . , yn), wherew2i = w1i orw2i is a
dual witness of w1i , it is indistinguishable to the coalition of all the other provers and verifiers whether P are usingW
1 or
W2. Here n is any polynomial of k.
Theorem 5. Witness dualism is preserved under polynomial composition of protocols.
Proof. Consider polynomially many protocols carried out concurrently (sequentially, in parallel, or with interleaved steps).
Assume by contradiction for infinitely many k, P (k) are subsets of provers who carry out their WD protocols faithfully
and for them WD is not preserved. That is, there exists a set of verifiers V(k), auxiliary inputs aux(k) to V(k), and
sets of witnesses W1(k) and W2(k) (defined as above), such that the two ensembles VP (Y(k),W1(k))(Y(k), aux(k)) and
VP (Y(k),W2(k))(Y(k), aux(k)) are polynomially distinguishable. By the hybrid argument [15,13], there exists i, such that if
all P ∈ P (k)with index less than i use witnesses fromW1(k), and all P ∈ P (k)with index greater than i use witnesses from
W2, the ensembles which differ only in the witness Pi is using are distinguishable by V(k). Denote the hybrid witnesses
W ′1(k) = (w11, . . . , w1i−1, w1i , w2i+1, . . . , w2n) and W ′2(k) = (w11, . . . , w1i−1, w2i , w2i+1, . . . , w2n). Now we construct a V ′,
which has (aux(k),W ′1(k),W ′2(k)) as part of its auxiliary input, distinguishes between faithful Pi usingw1i orw
2
i .
V ′ simulates the game againstV(k) as follows. For each j 6= i,V ′ simulates Pj byusing the j-th item inW ′1(k) as thewitness
to Pj. For the messages between Pi and V(k), it is relayed faithfully between Pi and V(k). Finally, if V(k) can distinguish
W ′1(k) = (w11, . . . , w1i−1, w1i , w2i+1, . . . , w2n) fromW ′2(k) = (w11, . . . , w1i−1, w2i , w2i+1, . . . , w2n), V ′ can distinguish between
faithful Pi usingw1i orw
2
i . It contradicts the assumption that the original protocol has witness dualism. 
The theorem above is useful for showing the security of the framework below.
4.1. A framework to construct id-imp-aa and id-imp-ca secure IBI schemes
Starting from the framework for constructing generic IBI schemes with id-imp-pa security (Section 3.1), we transform it
to a framework for constructing IBI schemes secure against active and concurrent attacks (i.e. id-imp-aa and id-imp-ca). The
transformation is to replace the TWR with a trapdoor strong-one-more relation (TSR) (Definition 5), and the HVZK-SS with
a Witness Dualism proof system with Special Soundness (WD-SS) (Definition 6).
The following theorem states that the resulting generic IBI scheme due to the transformation achieves both id-imp-aa
and id-imp-ca security.
Theorem 6. By replacing the TWR in the original generic construction of IBI schemes described in Section 3.1with a TSR, and the
HVZK-SS proof system with a WD-SS proof system, the resulting generic IBI construction is id-imp-aa and id-imp-ca secure in the
random oracle model, provided that the challenge length λ(k) of the WD-SS proof system is super logarithmic in k, where k ∈ N
is a security parameter.
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Proof. Suppose there exists an adversaryAwho breaks an IBI scheme constructed as above with advantage , we construct
a PPT algorithmB to break the strong-one-more resistance of the underlying TSR with advantage ′ ≥ 1/2( − 2−λ(k))2.
B simulates the id-imp-aa (resp. id-imp-ca) game by setting mpk = 〈R〉 and maintains two sets HU and CU, which are
initialized to empty.B also maintains a table T, each entry of T contains an identity I , and the value of H(I) and a witness of
H(I). T is also initialized to empty at the beginning of the simulation.B answersA’s queries as follows:
1. H-query: On input I ∈ {0, 1}∗, if I 6∈ T, B queries RAM to get a random point y ∈ ∆, then sets H(I) = y by putting
(I, y,⊥) into table T, and returns y. The symbol ‘‘⊥’’ denotes that the corresponding value is unknown yet. If I ∈ T, the
existing value of H(I) is returned.
2. INIT(I): If I ∈ HU ∪ CU,⊥ is returned. Otherwise,B checks if I is in table T. If I ∈ T, I is added into HU and a symbol ‘1’
is returned. Otherwise,B queries RAM to get a random point y ∈ ∆, and sets H(I) = y by putting (I, y,⊥) into table T, I
is then added into HU and a symbol ‘1’ is returned.
3. CORR(I): If I /∈ HU, ⊥ is returned. Otherwise, B looks for the entry corresponding to I in table T. If the witness (i.e the
third component of the entry) is⊥,B queries INV for a witness x of H(I), and replaces the⊥ symbol in that entry of table
T by x.B returns x toA. I is then removed from HU and added into CU.
4. PROV(I): If I 6∈ HU,⊥ is returned. Otherwise,B looks for the entry corresponding to I in table T and retrieves the witness
x of H(I). If the witness is unknown (i.e. the third component of the entry is⊥),B queries INV for a witness x of H(I), and
replaces the⊥ symbol in that entry by x.B then runs a copy of Pwith initial state x.
If A successfully impersonates a user Ib, that is created but not corrupted (i.e. H(Ib) is returned by RAM, but A has
not queried for its witness), with probability , based on the Reset Lemma (Appendix A) and the special soundness of the
WD-SS proof system,B can extract awitness xb of H(Ib), with probability at least (−2−λ(k))2, through the reset experiment
described in Lemma 3.
If B has never queried INV, for a witness of H(Ib), that is, the witness is not in table T yet, B successfully breaks the
strong-one-more resistance. Now ifB has queried INV for a witness of H(Ib), then the witness must be in the corresponding
entry (indexed by Ib) in table T. Due to Witness Dualism, with probability at least 1/2, the witness xb extracted by B
(with the help of A) is different from the one in table T. By Theorem 5, it follows that witness dualism is preserved under
concurrent composition. Hence,B can break the strong-one-more resistance of the underlying TSR with probability at least
1/2( − 2−λ(k))2. 
4.2. Instantiations of TSR family
4.2.1. Factoring based
A Blum-Williams generator [24,5] is a modulus generator that returns Blum-Williams (BW) moduli N , meaning that
N = pq with p ≡ q ≡ 3 (mod 4). Let QRN = {x2 mod N|x ∈ Z∗N} be the set of all quadratic residues modulo N . It is known
that if N is a BW modulus, then squaring is a permutation on QRN . Let Z∗N [+1] = {x ∈ Z∗N |JacN(x) = +1} where JacN(x) is
the Jacobi Symbol of x with respect to N . It is known that if N is a BW modulus, −1 is a non-square modulo N with Jacobi
Symbol+1, and for every element x ∈ Z∗N [+1], either x or−x is a square modulo N .
A TSR familyR′SQ can be constructed as follows. On input 1k,R′SQ .Gen′ runs the Blum-Williams generator to generate
(N, p, q), and sets relation
RSQ = {(x, y) ∈ Z∗N × Z∗N [+1] : x > (N − 1)/2; y ≡ ±x2 (mod N)}
and trapdoor information to (p, q). On input (〈RSQ 〉, x, y),R′SQ .Ver ′ outputs 1 if and only if x2 ≡ ±y (mod N). ForR′SQ .Inv′,
given (〈RSQ 〉, y, (p, q)) where y ∈ Z∗N [+1], it chooses uniformly at random an x ∈ Z∗N over the two square roots of±y that
are greater than (N − 1)/2 (remark: either y or−y is a square).
Theorem 7. If the factoring problem is hard, RSQ described above is a trapdoor strong-one-more relation.
Proof. Suppose there exists a PPT adversaryAwhich breaks the strong-one-more resistance of RSQ , with probability . We
build another PPT adversaryB to factorize N with probability at least /2.
B simulates the game of strong-one-more resistance as follows. When A queries the challenge oracle (i.e. RAM), B
selects uniformly at random an x ∈ Z∗N , such that x > (N − 1)/2, and returns y R←±x2 (mod N) toA. WhenA queries the
inversion oracle (i.e. INV) on y,B returns x toA.
If A wins the game, that is, A outputs a pair (x′, y′) ∈ RSQ such that y′ is an output of RAM but (x′, y′) does not appear
in the input/output pairs of the INV oracle, then, according to the simulation of RAM, B has randomly chosen a witness x
when generating y′. One of the following two events must occur:
E1: A has not queried INV with y′. If x′ 6= ±x,B is able to factorize N . Otherwise,B aborts. Since x is uniformly selected at
random, Pr[x′ 6= ±x] = 1/2.
E1: A has queried INV with y′. This implies that (x, y′) appears in the input/output pairs of the INV oracle. For A wins in
this event, we must have x′ 6= ±x. HenceB is always able to factorize N in this event.
Therefore, if A breaks the strong-one-more resistance with probability , B can factorize N with probability at least
/2. 
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4.2.2. RSA based
On input 1k, an RSA key generator (KG) outputs a modulus N that is the product of two distinct odd primes p, q such that
|p| = |q| = k/2, and exponents e, d such that ed ≡ 1(mod ϕ(N))where ϕ(N) = (p−1)(q−1) is the Euler’s totient function.
A prime-exponent RSA key generator only outputs parameters with prime e. The RSA problem is hard if
AdvrsaA (k) = Pr
 (N, e, d)← KG(1k);y R← Z∗N; x← A(1k,N, e, y) :
xe ≡ y (mod N)

is negligible in k for any PPT algorithmA. We construct a TSR familyR′RSA as follows.
On input 1k,R′RSA.Gen′ runs the prime-exponent RSA key generator to generate (N, e, d) such that prime e > 2λ(k) where
λ(k) is super-logarithmic in k. It then randomly picks g
R← Z∗N and sets the TSR RRSA = {((x1, x2), y) ∈ (Ze × Z∗N) × Z∗N :
g−x1x−e2 ≡ y (mod N)}, the trapdoor information is set to (N, d). ForR′RSA.Inv′, on input (〈RRSA〉, y, (N, d)), where y ∈ Z∗N , it
outputs (x1, x2)where x1
R← Ze and x2 = (gx1y)−d (mod N).
Theorem 8. If the RSA problem is hard, RRSA is a trapdoor strong-one-more relation.
Proof. Suppose there exists a PPT adversary A which breaks the strong-one-more resistance with probability . We
construct another PPT adversary B which solves the RSA problem with probability at least (1 − 1/e). Below is the
description ofB which simulates the game of strong-one-more resistance forA.
Given the RSA challenge yˆ, the adversary B sets g = yˆ and simulates the game as follows. When A queries RAM, B
randomly selects x1
R← Ze, x2 R← Z∗N , and returns y = g−x1x−e2 (mod N) toA. WhenA queries INV on y,B returns (x1, x2)
toA if y has been queried to RAM. Otherwise,B returns⊥.
IfAwins the game,A has output a pair ((x′1, x
′
2), y
′) ∈ RRSA. Suppose the witness of y′ generated byB for simulating the
corresponding RAM query of y′ is (x′′1, x
′′
2). Similar to the proof of Theorem 7, there are two events, and one of them must
occur.
E1: A has not queried INV with y′. Note that if x′′1 = x′1, so is between x′′2 and x′2. Since x′′1 is randomly chosen from Ze,
Pr[x′1 6= x′′1] = 1− 1/e.
E1: A has queried INVwith y′. This implies that ((x′′1, x
′′
2), y
′) appears in the input/output pairs of the INV oracle. ForAwins
in this event, we must have x′1 6= x′′1 .
WhenB obtains two distinct witnesses (x′1, x
′
2) and (x
′′
1, x
′′
2) for the same challenge y
′, since e is prime and 0 < |x′1−x′′1| <
e, by the extended Euclidian algorithm, two integers a, b can be found such that a(x′′1 − x′1)+ be = 1. Therefore,B can solve
the RSA problem instance yˆ by computing gb(x′2x′′
−1
2 )
a mod N .
By analyzing the combined probability of the two events E1 and E2 for the case that x′1 6= x′′1 , we can see thatB can break
the RSA problem with probability at least (1− 1/e). 
4.2.3. Strongly unforgeable digital signature based
Let SIG = (KG, S,V) be defined as in Section 3.2.3, but we now require that SIG is strongly unforgeable [1] against
knownmessage attacks [14] (seuf-kma). A signature scheme is said to be seuf-kma if for any PPT adversary, the probability
of producing a message-signature pair (m, σ ), such that this pair is not in the list of message-signature pairs the adversary
has already known, is negligible.
By using the same construction as in Section 3.2.3 but requiring the underlying SIG to be seuf-kma, the relation RSIG will
become a TSR. We have the following theorem.
Theorem 9. If SIG is seuf-kma, and for any message m ∈MS, there is more than one valid signature, RSIG is a trapdoor strong-
one-more relation.
Proof. Suppose there exists a PPT adversaryA which breaks the strong-one-more resistance of RSIG, we build a PPT forger
F which breaks seuf-kma of the underling SIG.
Suppose A makes at most Q (k) challenge queries where k ∈ N is the security parameter. F first gets Q (k) message-
signature pairs from its own simulator. Note that the messages are not chosen by F , but rather by its simulator. Then F
answers A’s challenge/inversion queries by simply sending back the corresponding message/signature. We can see that a
break of the strong-one-more resistance of RSIG by A with advantage  directly implies an successful forgery by B with
probability at least /2. 
In Appendix B.2, we show that Okamoto–RSA–IBI scheme falls into our framework. That is, it can be decomposed into two
parts: the RSA-based TSR, and a corresponding WD-SS. In Section 5.2, we propose a new id-imp-aa and id-imp-ca secure IBI
scheme which is a combination of the signature based TSR and a newWD-SS. This newWD-SS also illustrates that Witness
Dualism is a weaker form of Witness Indistinguishability.
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5. Applying the framework – Two new IBI schemes
5.1. An IBI scheme with id-imp-pa security
By applying the ‘‘TWR+ HVZK-SS’’ framework, in Appendix B.1, we showed the id-imp-pa security of many existing IBI
schemes, such as GQ-IBI [16] and Sh-IBI [22] under the trapdoor one-way permutation assumption of RSA, and Hs-IBI [17]
and ChCh-IBI [10] under the CDH problem assumption.2 In this section, we propose a new and efficient IBI scheme with
id-imp-pa security. By following the framework described in Section 3.1, we first propose a new TWR. We then propose an
HVZK-SS proof system for this new TWR. This new TWR is based on the following K-sCAA1 problem [20,11].
Definition 8 (K-sCAA1 Problem). Let G1,G2, q, P, e be the same parameters as in the CDH problem (Section 3.2.2). For any
s
R← Zq, set Q = sP and choose uniformly at random hi R← Zq for i = 0, 1, . . . ,K, where K is some polynomial in a security
parameter. Given (P,Q , h1, . . . , hK, 1h1+sP, . . . ,
1
hK+sP), compute (h,
1
h+sP) such that h /∈ {h1, h2, . . . , hK}.
The K-sCAA1 assumption [20,11] means that there is no PPT algorithm that can solve the K-sCAA1 problem with non-
negligible probability. Based on the K-sCAA1 assumption, we construct a TWR familyRK−sCAA1 as follows.
A K-sCAA1 Based TWR.
1. On input 1k, RK−sCAA1.Gen outputs (G1,G2, q, P, e,Q = sP, s) where s is randomly selected from Zq. The relation is
defined as RK−sCAA1 = {(x, y) : x ∈ G1; y ∈ Zq; e(yP + Q , x) = e(P, P)} and the trapdoor information as s.
2. On input (〈RK−sCAA1〉, x, y),RK−sCAA1.Ver outputs 1 if and only if e(yP + Q , x) = e(P, P).
3. On input (〈RK−sCAA1〉, y, s),RK−sCAA1.Inv outputs x as 1y+sP .
Theorem 10. If there exists a PPT algorithmwhich asks at most K+1 RAM queries, and wins the weak-one-more resistance game
for the TWR RK−sCAA1 with probability , there exists another PPT algorithm that solves the K-sCAA1 problem with probability at
least /(K+ 1).
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A which breaks the weak-one-more resistance. We build another adversary B
which breaks K-sCAA1.
B is given (h1, . . . , hK, 1h1+sP, . . . ,
1
hK+sP) where hi
R← Zq for i = 1, . . . ,K. B randomly picks h R← Zq and performs a
random permutation on h, h1, . . . , hK and gets h′1, . . . , h
′
K+1. Suppose h
′
i = h.
Now for them-th RAM query,B returns h′m toA. For the n-th INV query, ifA queries the witness of h′i ,B fails and aborts.
Otherwise, B returns the corresponding witness to A. If A outputs x such that e(hP + Q , x) = e(P, P), B outputs x and
halts. IfA halts,B halts.
If A wins the weak-one-more resistance game with probability , B breaks K-sCAA1 with probability at least
/(K+ 1). 
Remark. From the K-sCAA1 assumption [20,11], we can see that the relation RK−sCAA1 = {(x, y) : x ∈ G1; y ∈ Zq;
e(yP + Q , x) = e(P, P)} is non-samplable [2]. Hence, it is not a Trapdoor Samplable Relation [2] and cannot be captured by
the framework of [2].
5.1.1. A HVZK-SS Proof System for RK−sCAA1
We now propose an HVZK-SS proof system for the K-sCAA1 problem based TWR RK−sCAA1. The HVZK-SS is a non-trivial
canonical proof system (P,V)where P knows x such that (x, y) ∈ RK−sCAA1 and V has access to public information only, which
includes 〈RK−sCAA1〉 and y. The three moves Cmt, Ch and Rsp of the proof system are as follows.
1. Cmt := r(yP + Q )where r R← Zq
2. Ch := c where c R← Zq
3. Rsp := rcP + x
After receiving Rsp, V accepts if and only if
e(Rsp, yP + Q ) = e(P, P)e(P,Cmt)c .
Theorem 11. The interactive proof system (P,V) for the TWR RK−sCAA1 described above is an HVZK-SS proof system (Definition 4).
Proof. It is obvious that (P,V) is a non-trivial canonical proof system, satisfying the Completeness requirement.
For Special Soundness, we can see that given (Cmt, c1,Rsp1) and (Cmt, c2,Rsp2) with c1 6= c2, the witness x can be
extracted as (c2 − c1)−1(c2Rsp1 − c1Rsp2).
The proof system is also Honest Verifier Zero Knowledge, as we can construct a polynomial time algorithm SIM which
on input (〈RK−sCAA1〉, y), generates a conversation between P and Vwhose distribution is computationally indistinguishable
from that of a real conversation. The construction is as follows. Randomly choose c, z
R← Zq and set Ch = c , Rsp = zP ,
Cmt = c−1(z(yP + Q )− P). 
2 The abbreviations of these IBI schemes were first used by Bellare, Namprempre and Neven in [2].
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MKGen:
Generate (G1,G2, q, P, e) as in the CDH problem (Sec. 3.2.2).
Choose s
R← Zq , and compute Q = sP .
Let H : {0, 1}∗ → Zq be a hash function.
The master public keympk is set to (G1,G2, q, P, e,Q ,H) and
the master secret keymsk to s.
UKGen:
Given an identity I ∈ {0, 1}∗ , set user secret key usk[I] to 1H(I)+s P .
User Identification Protocol:
Prover P (usk[I] = 1H(I)+s P) Verifier V (mpk, I)
r
R← Zq
Cmt← r(H(I)P + Q )
Cmt -
c
R← Zqcﬀ
Rsp← rcP + usk[I]
Rsp -
e(Rsp,H(I)P + Q ) ?= e(P, P)e(P,Cmt)c
Fig. 1. A New id-imp-pa Secure IBI Scheme Based on the K-sCAA1 Assumption.
By applying the ‘‘TWR + HVZK-SS’’ framework (Section 3.1), a new IBI scheme is constructed from the K-sCAA1 based
TWR familyRK−sCAA1 and the corresponding HVZK-SS described above. According to Theorem 1, this IBI scheme is id-imp-pa
secure. Fig. 1 summarizes the scheme and the following corollary is obtained directly.
Corollary 1. The IBI scheme described in Fig. 1 is secure against impersonation under passive attacks (id-imp-pa), in the random
oracle model.
This new IBI scheme is very efficient in terms of both computational complexity and communication overhead, especially
at the prover side. In practice, the value H(I)P +Q can be pre-computed by user I (i.e. the prover). So the prover only needs
to perform two elliptic curve scalar multiplication operations in G1, and one of them (in the commitment phase) can also
be pre-computed. Therefore, this could be very suitable for smartcard applications. In addition, for the verifier, the value of
e(P, P) can also be pre-computed.
5.2. An IBI scheme with id-imp-aa and id-imp-ca security
By applying the ‘‘TSR + WD-SS" framework, in Section B.2, we showed the id-imp-aa and id-imp-ca security of the
Okamoto-RSA-IBI scheme [21]. In this section, we propose a new IBI scheme which also achieves id-imp-aa and id-imp-
ca security. The new scheme is constructed by applying the ‘‘TSR+WD-SS’’ framework. The TSR is based on the Katz–Wang
signature scheme [18].We then propose aWD-SS proof system for this TSR. As of independent interest, unlike the Okamoto-
RSA-IBI scheme (Appendix B.2), this new WD-SS proof system is not witness indistinguishable. This means that our newly
introduced notion of Witness Dualism is a strict superset of witness indistinguishability.
5.2.1. A TSR family based on a seuf-kma digital signature scheme
Let G be a cyclic group of prime order q with generator g such that |q| > k, where k ∈ N is a security parameter. Let
H ′ : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}k be a hash function which is assumed to behave as a random oracle for security analysis. Below is the
Katz–Wang signature scheme [18].
To generate a public/secret key pair, randomly choose h
R← G and x R← Zq, then compute y1 = gx and y2 = hx, and set
the public key as PK = (h, y1, y2) and the secret key as SK = x. To sign a messagem, the following steps are carried out.
1. Randomly choose r
R← Zq.
2. Compute A = g r , B = hr , and c = H ′(A, B,m).
3. Compute s = cx+ r mod q and return the signature σ = (c, s).
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To verify the signature σ , A = g sy−c1 and B = hsy−c2 are first computed, then σ is considered valid if c = H ′(A, B,m).
The scheme has been shown to be strongly unforgeable under the DDH assumption [6]. According to Section 4.2.3, we can
transform it to a TSR according to the instantiation of TSR based on strongly unforgeable (seuf-kma) digital signature. Below
is the resulting TSR familyR′KW .
Katz–Wang signature based TSR
1. On input 1k,R′KW .Gen′ generates (G, q, g,H ′, h, y1, y2) according to the Katz–Wang signature, then defines the relation
RKW on ({0, 1}k × Zq) × {0, 1}k as {((c, s),m) : c ∈ {0, 1}k; s ∈ Zq;m ∈ {0, 1}k; c = H ′(g sy−c1 , hxy−c2 ,m)} and the
trapdoor as x.
2. On input (〈RKW 〉, (c, s),m),R′KW .Ver ′ outputs 1 if and only if c = H ′(g sy−c1 , hxy−c2 ,m).
3. For R′KW .Inv′, on input (〈RKW 〉,m, x), the output (i.e. the witness) (c, s) is computed as c = H ′(g r , hr ,m) and s =
cx+ r mod q, where r R← Zq.
Corollary 2. RKW is a trapdoor strong-one-more relation.
Proof. This proposition follows directly from the result of Theorem 9 as both of the two conditions stated in Theorem 9 are
satisfied. The first one is that the Katz–Wang digital signature scheme is seuf-kma. The second one, which is obvious, is that
there are more than one valid signatures for any messagem ∈ {0, 1}∗. 
Remark. We can see that RKW is a non-samplable relation. Hence, the IBI scheme described in Fig. 2 cannot be captured by
the framework of [2].
5.2.2. A WD-SS proof system for RKW
We now propose aWD-SS proof system (P,V) for RWD, where P knows (c, s) such that ((c, s),m) ∈ RWD and V has access
to public information only, which includes 〈RWD〉 andm. The threemovesCmt,Ch andRsp of the proof system are as follows.
1. Cmt := (A, B, A′, B′, T1, T2, T ′1, T ′2) where A = g sy−c1 , B = hsy−c2 , A′ = g r ′ , B′ = hr ′ , T1 = gλ, T2 = hλ, T ′1 = gz′(A′yc′1 )−α′ ,
T ′2 = hz′(B′yc′2 )−α′ , here r ′, λ, z ′, α′ R← Zq and c ′ ← H ′(A′, B′,m).
2. Ch := α0 where α0 R← Zq.
3. Rsp := (α′, α, z ′, z)where α = α0 − α′ mod q and z = λ+ αs mod q.
After receiving Rsp, V accepts if and only if α+α′ = α0, T1 = gzU−α , T2 = hzR−α , T ′1 = gz′U ′−α′ and T ′2 = hz′R′−α′ where
U = Ayc1, R = Byc2, U ′ = A′yc′1 and R′ = B′yc′2 .
We can see this interactive proof system actually conducts a proof that the prover P, knows at least one of two valid
signatures ofm.
Lemma 1. The interactive proof system (P,V) above for RKW satisfies the Special Soundness requirement of the WD-SS proof
system (Definition 6).
Proof. Given two acceptable conversations:
((A, B, A′, B′, T1, T2, T ′1, T
′
2), α0 , (α
′, α, z ′, z))
((A, B, A′, B′, T1, T2, T ′1, T
′
2), αˆ0 , (αˆ
′, αˆ, zˆ ′, zˆ))
where V outputs ‘accept’ and α0 6= αˆ0, at least one of the inequalities α 6= αˆ and α′ 6= αˆ′ must hold. Without loss of
generality, suppose α 6= αˆ, then (s, c) can be obtained from s = (z − zˆ)(α − αˆ)−1 and c = H ′(A, B,m). Therefore, at least
one of the two witnesses (s, c) and (s′, c ′) can be extracted. 
Lemma 2. The interactive proof system (P,V) above forRKW satisfies theWitness Dualism requirement of theWD-SS proof system
(Definition 6).
Proof. For the two valid signatures σ = (c, s) (with respect to random coins r) and σ ′ = (c ′, s′) (with respect to random
coins r ′) of message m, the ensembles, VP(pub,σ )(pub, aux) where σ ′ is the dual witness, and VP(pub,σ ′)(pub, aux) where σ is
the dual witness, generated as V’s views of the interactive proof, are identically distributed, where pub refers to (〈RWD〉,m)
and aux is any auxiliary input for V. 
Remark (Important). (A′, B′) are computed once for all. That is, after (A′, B′) are computed by the prover for the first
time, they will remain unchanged for all the subsequent protocol runs. In other words, we may consider A′, B′ as system
parameters of the prover. This is crucial formaking sure that the interactive proof system satisfies witness dualism. Consider
the following scenario, verifier (or distinguisher) D takes the transcript of one conversation between the prover and an
honest verifier as part of its auxiliary input, thenD honestly runs the identification protocol with the prover, if the prover
uses different (A′1, B
′
1) and (A
′
2, B
′
2) in two conversations (i.e., one in the auxiliary input ofD and the other in the conversation
with D), D can easily recognize the real user secret key used by the prover. In other words, after (A′, B′) (with respect to
random coins r ′ and hence signature σ ′) are used by the prover (with user secret key σ ) for the first time, there is only one
dual witness of σ , which is σ ′.
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MKGen:
Choose a cyclic group G of prime order qwith generator g such that |q| > k.
Choose hash functions H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}k and H ′ : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}k .
Randomly choose h
R← G and x R← Z∗q , and compute y1 = gx and y2 = hx .
Setmpk = (G, q, g, h, y1, y2,H,H ′) andmsk = x.
UKGen:
Randomly choose r
R← Zq , compute A = g r , B = hr , c = H ′(A, B,H(I))
and s = cx+ r mod q. The user secret key is usk[I] = (c, s).
User Identification Protocol:
The prover randomly chooses r ′ R← Zq , and computes A← g sy−c1 , B← hsy−c2 ,
A′ ← g r ′ , B′ ← hr ′ and c ′ ← H ′(A′, B′,H(I)).
Prover P (c, s) Verifier V (mpk, I)
λ
R← Zq , T1 ← gλ , T2 ← hλ
z ′ R← Zq, α′ R← Zq
T ′1 ← gz′ (A′yc′1 )−α′
T ′2 ← hz′ (B′yc′2 )−α′
A, B, A′, B′, T1, T2, T ′1, T
′
2 -
α0
R← Zq
c ← H ′(A, B,H(I))
c ′ ← H ′(A′, B′,H(I))
U ← Ayc1, R← Byc2
U ′ ← A′yc′1 , R′ ← B′yc′2
α0ﬀ
α← α0 − α′ mod q
z ← λ+ αs mod q
z, z ′, α, α′ -
α + α′ ?= α0
T1
?= gzU−α
T2
?= hzR−α
T ′1
?= gz′U ′−α′
T ′2
?= hz′R′−α′
Fig. 2. A New id-imp-aa and id-imp-ca Secure IBI Scheme Based on Katz–Wang Signature Scheme.
Theorem 12. The interactive proof system (P,V) for the TSR RKW described above is a WD-SS proof system (Definition 6).
This theorem follows the two lemmas above.
By applying the ‘‘TSR +WD-SS’’ framework (Section 4.1), we combine the seuf-kma signature based TSR familyR′KW and
the WD-SS described above to construct an IBI scheme. According to Theorem 6, the resulting IBI scheme is both id-imp-aa
and id-imp-ca secure. The scheme is summarized in Fig. 2 and the following corollary is obtained directly.
Corollary 3. The IBI scheme described in Fig. 2 is secure against impersonation under active attacks (id-imp-aa) and concurrent
attacks (id-imp-ca) in the random oracle model.
Remark. For witness indistinguishability, it requires that the verify cannot tell which witness is used by the prover among
all the valid witnesses. In our protocol, although the verifier cannot tell which of σ and σ ′ is used by the prover, the verifier
can still exclude all other witnesses (i.e. other valid signatures of H(I)). Therefore, different from the Okamoto-RSA-IBI
(Appendix B.2), our WD-SS protocol is not witness indistinguishable. For details, please refer to the discussions following
Definition 6 and Lemma 2.
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6. Security without random oracle
In this section, we evaluate the security of our IBI construction frameworks without random oracle. We will show in
the standard model that the generic constructions described in Section 3.1 and Section 4.1 achieve the security against
impersonation under passive attack and active/concurrent attacks, respectively, but in a weaker security model than the
fully adaptive chosen-IDmodel used in the games of id-imp-pa, id-imp-aa and id-imp-ca defined in Section 2. This newmodel
is closely related to the conventional selective-ID model [8,9,7], and we call this new model asWeak Selective-ID Model. For
a conventional selective-ID model, the adversary has to commit to an identity to be attacked before knowing the master
public key. In a weak selective-ID model, the adversary can commit to a (polynomially bounded) set U of identities before
knowing themaster public key, and is also allowed to adaptively corrupt some of those committed identities. The adversary
then chooses an (uncorrupted) identity in U to attack. The formal definition is given as follows.
Definition 9 (wsid-imp-pa). For an IBI scheme (MKGen,UKGen, P,V), the weak selective-ID security against imperson-
ation under passive attack (wsid-imp-pa) is defined by the following game, which is carried out by a simulator against an
adversaryA. Let k ∈ N be a security parameter.
1. Init: A outputs a set U of distinct identities such that |U| ≤ `(k) where `(·) is a polynomial function (in the following,
we simply write ` to represent `(k)).
2. (mpk,msk)← MKGen(1k) is executed andmpk is given toA. Two sets are maintained: HU and CU. Initially, HU is set to
U and CU is empty. For each I ∈ HU, usk[I] ← UKGen(msk, I) is executed.
3. A can then make queries to the following oracles:
(a) CORR(I) – corrupt a user with identity I: If I /∈ HU ,⊥ is returned, otherwise, I is deleted from HU and added into CU,
and usk[I] is returned.
(b) CONV(I) – get a conversation between user I (the prover) and a verifier: If I /∈ HU , ⊥ is returned, otherwise, a
conversation between a prover with initial state usk[I] and a verifier with initial state (mpk, I) is returned.
4. A can adaptively query CORR and CONV, and then outputs an identity Ib ∈ HU , which corresponds to the user that A
wants to impersonate. After receiving Ib, the simulator removes Ib from HU and adds it into CU.
5. A begins a run of the user identification protocol with a verifier V (initialized with (mpk, Ib)) which is simulated by the
simulator.A can continue querying CORR and CONV. The simulator halts when V outputs ‘accept’ or ‘reject’.
The wsid-imp-pa advantage of A on security parameter k is defined as the probability that V outputs ‘accept’. The IBI
scheme (MKGen,UKGen, P,V) is said to be wsid-imp-pa secure if the wsid-imp-pa advantage is negligible for any PPT
adversaryA.
wsid-imp-aa and wsid-imp-ca security. The wsid-imp-aa and wsid-imp-ca security are defined similarly by replacing the
CONV oracle with a PROV oracle as in Section 2.
Discussions. The difference between this new weak selective-ID model and the original adaptive chosen-ID model
(Section 2) is that in the weak selective-ID model, the adversary has to choose the set of targeting identities before the
master public/secret key pair is generated and therefore, the adversary is not allowed to adaptively choose some new
identities to attack after the master public key is known. For other adversarial capabilities, these two models are the same,
particulary, bothmodels allow the adversary to corrupt identities adaptively. In order to remove the random oracle, we look
for a replacement of H while trying to keep the rest of the frameworks unchanged. We propose to use a family of `-wise
independent hash functions [8]. Let H` be a family of `-wise independent hash functions from {0, 1}∗ to ∆.3 The crucial
property ofH` is the following.
Given elements x1, x2, . . . , xn ∈ {0, 1}∗ and g1, g2, . . . , gn ∈ ∆ (with n ≤ `), there exists an efficient algorithm to sample
a random H ∈ H` such that H(xi) = gi for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. One possible instantiation given in [8] for ∆ = G1 in the CDH
problem (Section 3.2.2) is to letH` = {Hh0,...,h`(x)}h0,...,h`∈G1 , where Hh0,...,h`(x) = h0+ x˜h1+ x˜2h2+· · ·+ x˜`h`, here x˜ = G(x)
where G : {0, 1}∗ → Z|G1| is a collision resistant hash function.
We modify our construction in Section 3.1 as follows:
1. MKGen: (〈R〉, t)← R.Gen(1k), H R← H`. Setmpk = (〈R〉,H) andmsk = t .
2. UKGen: on input I ∈ {0, 1}∗, run x← R.Inv(〈R〉,H(I), t) and set usk[I] = x.
3. (P,V): run P with the prover algorithm P of the HVZK-SS (WD-SS, respectively) proof
system with initial state usk[I], and V with the verifier algorithm V of the HVZK-SS (WD-SS,
respectively) proof system with initial state (〈R〉,H(I)).
Theorem 13 (Theorem 1, revised). Let R be a Trapdoor Weak-one-more Relation (TWR) which has an HVZK-SS proof system
and H` be a family of `-wise independent hash functions, for some polynomial ` in k, where k ∈ N is a security parameter.
If the challenge length λ(k) of the HVZK-SS proof system is super logarithmic in k, then an IBI scheme constructed as above is
wsid-imp-pa secure in the standard model.
3We use the notation∆ for the range of the function family as the family is always used in association with a relation onW ×∆ in this paper.
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Proof. Suppose there exists an adversaryAwho breaks an IBI scheme constructed as above with advantage , we construct
a PPT algorithmB to break the weak-one-more resistance of the underlying TWR Rwith advantage ′ ≥ ( − 2−λ(k))2.
The proof essentially follows the original proof of Theorem 1 except that the simulator B chooses a hash function in
the following way. After receiving the set of identities U = {I1, . . . , Iρ} (note that ρ ≤ `) in the Init stage of the game in
Definition 9, B queries RAM and receives ρ random points g1, g2, . . . , gρ ∈ ∆. B then randomly chooses H fromH` such
that H(Ii) = gi for i = 1, 2, . . . , ρ. SinceH` is a family of `-wise independent hash functions, the choice of H is identically
distributed to that in the real game.B answers the CORR and CONVqueries as in the proof of Theorem1. Finally, by following
the sameprobability analysis as that in the original proof,B can break the underlying trapdoorweak-one-more relationwith
probability at least ( − 2−λ(k))2. 
Similarly, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 14 (Theorem 6, revised). Let R be a Trapdoor Strong-one-more Relation (TSR) which has a WD-SS proof system and
H` be a family of `-wise independent hash functions, for some polynomial ` in k, where k ∈ N is a security parameter. If the
challenge length λ(k) of the WD-SS proof system is super logarithmic in k, the IBI scheme constructed as above is wsid-imp-aa
and wsid-imp-ca secure in the standard model.
Discussions. In the proof of Theorem 1, due to the idealness assumption of the random oracle, B can indistinguishably
simulate a real game while mapping random challenge points from ∆ obtained from RAM oracle to the values of H(Ii)
corresponding to identities Ii which are to be attacked. Now in the standard model, we do not have the random oracle to
do the indistinguishable mapping. Instead, we employ a family of `-wise independent hash functionsH` so that for all the
n pre-selected identities in U, the simulator (that is,B) can still map the random points from∆ obtained from RAM oracle
to the values of H(Ii), and still have the game simulated indistinguishably. However, the value of n (that is the number of
to-be-attacked identities) is bounded by that of ` and those identities have to be pre-selected before generating the master
public/secret key pair. As a result, in the standard model, we can only show that our framework is secure in the weak
selective-ID model. We leave the construction of a comparable framework secure under the fully adaptive chosen-IDmodel
an open problem.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a new framework to the design and analysis of Identity-Based Identification (IBI) schemes.We
separate an IBI scheme into two parts: a hard relation and an interactive proof system. In order to obtain IBI schemes with
different security levels,we specified the security requirements of these twobuilding blocks anddefined several newnotions
for them. We proved that a Trapdoor Weak-one-more Relation (TWR) combining with an Honest Verifier Zero-Knowledge
proof with Special Soundness (HVZK-SS) yield an IBI scheme secure against passive attack, and a Trapdoor Strong-one-more
Relation (TSR) combining with aWitness Dualism proof with Special Soundness (WD-SS) yield an IBI scheme secure against
active and concurrent attacks. Both of these results are proved in the random oracle model under the fully adaptive chosen-
ID model (id-imp-pa, id-imp-aa and id-imp-ca) and in the standard model under the weak selective-ID model (wsid-imp-pa,
wsid-imp-aa and wsid-imp-ca).
We also showed that the newnotions defined in this paper can capture a large number of instantiations. This is important
because it allows us to adopt a systematicway for analyzing the security ofmany existing IBI schemes. In addition to this, the
framework also provides us an effective way for constructing new IBI schemes.We proposed two new IBI schemes, onewith
security against impersonation under passive attack, and the other one with security against impersonation under active
and concurrent attacks. None of them is in any existing framework.
The new notions defined in this paper, namely TWR, TSR and WD-SS, are of independent interest. We believe that they
can be used for other applications as well in the near future.
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Appendix A. Reset lemma
Lemma 3 (Reset Lemma [3,2]). Let CP be the prover in a canonical interactive proof system with challenge set ChSet and
challenge length λ(·). StV and StCP are the initial states of the verifier and CP, respectively. Let acc(StCP , StV ) be the probability
that the verifier accepts, i.e., the probability that the following experiment returns1:
Choose a random tape ρ for CP; (Cmt, St ′CP)← CP(StCP , ρ); Ch R← ChSet;
(Rsp, St ′′CP)← CP(Ch, St ′CP); d← Dec(StV ,Cmt‖Ch‖Rsp);
Return d
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MKGen:
Generate (N, e, d) by running the prime-exponent RSA key generator (Sec. 4.2) such that e > 2λ(k)
where λ(k) is super-logarithmic in k.
Let H : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗N be a hash function.
The master public keympk is set to (N, e,H, λ(k)) and
the master secret keymsk to (N, d).
UKGen:
Given an identity I ∈ {0, 1}∗ , set user secret key usk[I] to (H(I))d mod N .
Sh Identification Protocol:
P (usk[I]) V (mpk, I)
r
R← Z∗N
Cmt← re mod N
Cmt -
c
R← Z2λ(k)cﬀ
Rsp← usk[I]rc mod N
Rsp -
Rspe
?= H(I)Cmtc mod N
GQ Identification Protocol:
P (usk[I]) V (mpk, I)
r
R← Z∗N
Cmt← re mod N
Cmt -
c
R← Z2λ(k)cﬀ
Rsp← usk[I]c r mod N
Rsp -
Rspe
?= H(I)cCmtmod N
Fig. 3. The Sh-IBI and GQ-IBI.
and res(StCP , StV ) the probability that the following reset experiment returns1:
Choose a random tape ρ for CP; (Cmt, St ′CP)← CP(StCP , ρ)
Ch1
R← ChSet; (Rsp1, St ′′CP)← CP(Ch1, St ′CP);
d1 ← Dec(StV ,Cmt‖Ch1‖Rsp1)
Ch2
R← ChSet; (Rsp2, St ′′′CP)← CP(Ch2, St ′CP);
d2 ← Dec(StV ,Cmt‖Ch2‖Rsp2)
If (d1 = d2 = 1 and Ch1 6= Ch2) return 1, else return 0
Then,
res(StCP , StV ) ≥ (acc(StCP , StV )− 2−λ(k))2.
Appendix B. Existing IBI schemes captured by the new framework
B.1. IBI schemes with id-imp-pa security
B.1.1. Sh-IBI [22,2] and GQ-IBI [16,2]
The Sh-IBI scheme is a combination of the RSA (one candidate of Trapdoor One-way Permutation) based TWR and an
HVZK-SS proof system. The GQ-IBI scheme uses the same TWR but a different HVZK-SS.
Theorem 15. The Sh identification protocol described in Fig. 3 is an HVZK-SS proof system (Definition 4).
Proof. It is obvious that (P,V) is a non-trivial canonical proof system satisfying the Completeness requirement.
For Special Soundness, we can see that given (Cmt, c1,Rsp1) and (Cmt, c2,Rsp2)with c1 6= c2 (without loss of generality,
we assume c1 > c2), we can use the Extended Euclidian Algorithm to find two integers a, b such that a(c1 − c2) + be = 1.
Then usk[I] can be extracted as Rsp1((Rsp1/Rsp2)aCmtb)−c1 mod N .
The proof system is also Honest Verifier Zero Knowledge as we can construct a polynomial time algorithm SIM which
generates a conversation betweenP andV as follows. Randomly choose c R← Z2λ(k) anduse the Extended EuclidianAlgorithm
to compute integers a, b such that ac + be = 1. Randomly select z R← Z∗N and set Ch = c , Rsp = H(I)bzc , Cmt = zeH(I)−a
mod N . 
Theorem 16. The GQ identification protocol described in Fig. 3 is an HVZK-SS proof system (Definition 4).
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MKGen:
Generate (G1,G2, q, P, e) as in the CDH problem (Sec. 3.2.2).
Choose s
R← Zq , and compute Q = sP .
Let H : {0, 1}∗ → Zq be a hash function.
Set the master public keympk to (G1,G2, q, P, e,Q ,H) and
the master secret keymsk to s.
UKGen:
Given an identity I ∈ {0, 1}∗ , set user secret key usk[I] to sH(I).
Hs Identification Protocol:
P (usk[I]) V (mpk, I)
r
R← Zq
Cmt← e(P, P)r
Cmt -
c
R← Zqcﬀ
Rsp← rP + usk[I]c
Rsp -
e(Rsp, P) ?= e(H(I),Q )cCmt
ChCh Identification Protocol:
P (usk[I]) V (mpk, I)
r
R← Zq
Cmt← rH(I)
Cmt -
c
R← Zqcﬀ
Rsp← (r + c)usk[I]
Rsp -
e(Rsp, P) ?= e(Cmt+ cH(I),Q )
Fig. 4. The Hs-IBI and ChCh-IBI.
Proof. It is obvious that (P,V) is a non-trivial canonical proof system satisfying the Completeness requirement.
For Special Soundness, we can see that given (Cmt, c1,Rsp1) and (Cmt, c2,Rsp2)with c1 6= c2 (without loss of generality,
we assume c1 > c2), we can use the Extended Euclidian Algorithm to compute integers a, b such that a(c1 − c2)+ be = 1.
Then usk[I] can be extracted as (Rsp1/Rsp2)a(H(I))b mod N .
The proof system is also Honest Verifier Zero Knowledge as we can construct a polynomial time algorithm SIM which
generates a conversation between P and V as follows. Randomly choose c R← Z2λ(k) and z R← Z∗N and set Ch = c , Rsp = z,
Cmt = zeH(I)−c mod N . 
Corollary 4. The Sh-IBI and GQ-IBI are secure against impersonation under passive attack (id-imp-pa) under the RSA assumption
in the random oracle model.
B.1.2. Hs-IBI [17,2] and ChCh-IBI [10,2]
The Hs-IBI and ChCh-IBI can be decomposed into two parts: a CDH-based TWR and an HVZK-SS. These two schemes are
reviewed in Fig. 4.
Theorem 17. The Hs identification protocol is an HVZK-SS proof system (Definition 4).
Proof. It is obvious that (P,V) is a non-trivial canonical proof system satisfying the Completeness requirement.
For Special Soundness, we can see that given (Cmt, c1,Rsp1) and (Cmt, c2,Rsp2) with c1 6= c2, we can extract usk[I] as
(c1 − c2)−1(Rsp1 − Rsp2).
The proof system is also Honest Verifier Zero Knowledge, as we can construct a polynomial time algorithm SIM which
generates a conversation between P and V as follows. Randomly choose c R← Zq and Z R← G1 and set Ch = c , Rsp = Z ,
Cmt = e(Z, P)e(H(I),Q )−c . 
Theorem 18. The ChCh identification protocol is an HVZK-SS proof system (Definition 4).
Proof. It is obvious that (P,V) is a non-trivial canonical proof system satisfying the Completeness requirement.
For Special Soundness, we can see that given (Cmt, c1,Rsp1) and (Cmt, c2,Rsp2)with c1 6= c2, usk[I] can be extracted as
(c1 − c2)−1(Rsp1 − Rsp2).
The proof system is also Honest Verifier Zero Knowledge, as we can construct a polynomial time algorithm SIM which
generates a conversation between P and V as follows. Randomly choose c R← Zq and z R← Zq and set Ch = c , Rsp = zQ ,
Cmt = zP − cH(I). 
Corollary 5. The Hs-IBI and ChCh-IBI are secure against impersonation under passive attack (id-imp-pa) under the CDH
assumption in the random oracle model.
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MKGen:
Generate (N, e, d) by running the prime-exponent RSA key generator (Sec. 4.2) such that e > 2λ(k)
where λ(k) is super-logarithmic in k. Randomly picks g
R← Z∗N .
Let H : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗N be a hash function.
The master public keympk is set to (N, e, g,H, λ(k)) and
the master secret keymsk to (N, d).
UKGen:
Given an identity I ∈ {0, 1}∗ , set user secret key usk[I] to (x1, x2)where x1 R← Ze and
x2 = (gx1H(I))−d (mod N).
Okamoto-RSA Identification Protocol:
Prover P (usk[I] = (x1, x2)) Verifier V (mpk, I)
y1
R← Ze; y2 R← Z∗N
Cmt← gy1ye2 mod N
Cmt -
c
R← Z2λ(k)cﬀ
z1 ← y1 + cx1 mod e
z2 ← gb(y1+cx1)/ecy2xc2 mod N Rsp = (z1, z2) -
Cmt
?= gz1 ze2H(I)c mod N
Fig. 5. The Okamoto-RSA-IBI.
B.2. IBI schemes with id-imp-aa and id-imp-ca security
B.2.1. Okamoto-RSA-IBI
The Okamoto-RSA-IBI [21] can be decomposed into two parts: the RSA-based TSR and aWD-SS proof system. The scheme
is reviewed in Fig. 5.
Theorem 19. The Okamoto-RSA identification protocol is a WD-SS proof system (Definition 4).
Proof. It is obvious that (P,V) is a non-trivial canonical proof system, satisfying the Completeness requirement.
For Special Soundness, we can see that given (Cmt, c,Rsp) and (Cmt, c ′,Rsp′)with c 6= c ′ (without loss of generality, we
assume c > c ′), we can extract usk[I] as follows: first, compute x1 = (c− c ′)−1(z1− z ′1)mod e; then compute y1 = z1− cx1
mod e, and calculate
X = z2/g
b(y1+cx1)/ec
z ′2/gb(y1+c
′x1)/ec = x
c−c′
2 mod N (1)
Y = (H(I)gx1)−1) = xe2 mod N (2)
then use the Extended Euclidian Algorithm to compute integers a, b such that a(c − c ′) + be = 1, finally compute
x2 = (X)a(Y )b mod N .
As proved in [21], the Okamoto-RSA identification protocol is witness indistinguishable, so it is also a witness dualism
proof system. 
Corollary 6. The Okamoto-RSA-IBI is secure against impersonation under active and concurrent attacks (id-imp-aa and id-imp-
ca) under the RSA assumption in the random oracle model.
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